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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This case is on appeal from a final judgment and a final
order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
(Honorable William A. Thorne).

Cheryl Holmstrom, the

plaintiff-appellant, appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 (j).

The

Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, '"poured" this appeal "over" to this Court.
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (j) .
II.
A.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether, in this case in which Ms. Holmstrom's theory

of the case, and the evidence regarding defendant-appellee
Joseph Hyatt's negligence, included Mr. Hyatt's selection of an
unsafe route along which to drive the C.R. England truck, and
in which the "substantial role" aspect of proximate cause law
was central to the jury's no-proximate-cause determination, the
District Court committed reversible error in refusing to give
Ms. Holmstrom's proposed "unsafe route" instruction.
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review
The applicable standard of appellate review with
respect to this issue appears to be de novo

(as purely a

question of law). "[A]ppellate review of a trial court!s
determination of the law is usually characterized by the term
1

N

correctness.!fl

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994);

"correctness" means "the appellate court decides the matter for
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's
determination of the law."
433 (Utah 1993).

Id.;

State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431,

See, also, in the specific context of jury

instructions, Ong Intfl (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850
P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993).

Also, to require a new trial, any

error in jury instructions must be prejudicial.

E.g.,

Vitale

v. Belmont Springs, 916 P.2d 359, 363 (Utah App. 1996);
Summerill v. Shipley, 890 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah App. 1995).
This issue was preserved in the District Court
proceedings by Ms. Holmstrom's submission of her proposed Jury
Instruction No. S-2 (R. at 778), and by argument, culminating
in the District Court's refusal to include that instruction in
its charge to the jury (Tr. Vol. V, 808-14).
B.

Whether, in this case in which Ms. Holmstrom was

driving at. what Mr. Hyatt and his employer, defendant-appellee
C.R. England, Inc., acknowledged to be a reasonable speed when
Mr. Hyatt made a wide right turn and partially blocked the lane
of travel in which Ms. Holmstrom was traveling, in which
Ms. Holmstrom braked hard and tried to go left, and in which
the jury determined that Mr. Hyatt's negligence was not a
proximate cause of any of Ms. Holmstrom's injuries, the
District Court committed reversible error in refusing to give
2

the "sudden peril" proximate cause instruction proposed by
Ms. Holmstrom.
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review
The applicable standard of appellate review with
respect to this issue appears to be de novo
question of law).

(as purely a

ff

[A]ppellate review of a trial courtf s

determination of the law is usually characterized by the term
* correctness. ,,f

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994);

"correctness" means "the appellate court decides the matter for
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's
determination of the law."
433 (Utah 1993).

Id.;

State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431,

See, also, in the specific context of jury

instructions, Ong Int!l (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850
P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993).

Also, to require a new trial, any

error in jury instructions must be prejudicial.

E.g.,

Vitale

v. Belmont Springs, 916 P.2d 359, 363 (Utah App. 1996);
Summerill v. Shipley, 890 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah App. 1995).
This issue was preserved in the District Court
proceedings by Ms. Holmstrom's submission of her proposed Jury
Instruction S-3 (R. at 779), and by oral argument, culminating
in the trial court's refusal to utilize the instruction
submitted by Ms. Holmstrom.1

1

It should be noted that the District Court, after ruling that it would not
give the subject proposed instruction, stated that it would consider giving
-}

C.

Whether the District Court committed reversible error

in denying the first part of Ms. Holmstrom's Motion for Partial
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New Trial on
Remaining Issues or, in the Alternative, for New Trial on All
Issues, based on the proposition that no reasonable jury could
determine that Mr. Hyatt's negligence was not a proximate cause
of at least some of Ms. Holmstrom's claimed injuries and
damages.
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review
A trial court is justified in granting a directed
verdict only if, considering all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, there is no competent
evidence that would support a verdict for the non-moving party.
Merino v. Albertsons, Inc., 975 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1999).

A

trial court should grant a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict only when it determines, after reviewing the
evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to the non-moving party, that the evidence is
insufficient to support a verdict for the non-moving party.
E.g.,

Ricci v. Schoultz, 963 P.2d 784, 785 (Utah App. 1998).

The applicable standard of appellate review with respect to

a somewhat similar instruction (Tr. Vol. V, 819-22); that the parties were
unable to agree on a substitute; and that no ''sudden peril" instruction was
ultimately included in the District Court's charge to the jury.

4

t h i s issue i s t h a t the a p p e l l a t e court will "reverse only

if,

viewing the evidence in the l i g h t most favorable to the
prevailing party,

[ i t ] conclude[s] t h a t the evidence i s

i n s u f f i c i e n t to support the v e r d i c t . " 2

Collins v. Wilson, 984

P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 1999). In unusual circumstances, a
reviewing court may reassess witness c r e d i b i l i t y if the
testimony i s " i n h e r e n t l y improbable."

State v. Workman, 852

P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993).
This issue was preserved in the D i s t r i c t Court
proceedings by Ms. Holmstrom's motion for d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t

(Tr.

Vol. V, 832-32) at the conclusion of defendants' case and by
submission of P l a i n t i f f ' s Motion for P a r t i a l Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New Trial on Remaining
Issues or, in the A l t e r n a t i v e , for New T r i a l on All Issues (R.
at 899-901), her Memorandum in support of that Motion (R. at
907-922), her submission of her Reply Memorandum in support of
t h a t Motion (R. at 938-946), and at o r a l argument (Tr. of
February 25, 1999 proceedings, at 1-25) on t h a t Motion.
D.

Whether the D i s t r i c t Court committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r

in denying the second part of Ms. Holmstrom's Motion for
2

This r e c i t a t i o n of t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a n d a r d of a p p e l l a t e review i s t a k e n ,
verbatim,
from "Utah Standards of A p p e l l a t e Review - R e v i s e d , " by Judge
Norman H. Jackson, an a r t i c l e t h a t appeared i n a r e c e n t e d i t i o n of t h e Utah
Bar J o u r n a l . Ms. Holmstrom's counsel a l s o c r e d i t t h a t a r t i c l e for o t h e r
p a r t s of the a n a l y s i s s t a n d a r d of a p p e l l a t e review a n a l y s i s s e t f o r t h in
t h i s Brief.

c

Partial Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New Trial
on Remaining Issues or, in the Alternative, for New Trial on
All Issues.
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review
So long as the district court applies the correct
legal standards, a trial court has discretion to deny a motion
for new trial (e.g., Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d
937, 940 (Utah 1993).

The applicable standard of appellate

review with respect to this issue appears to be whether the
District Court clearly abused its discretion in denying that
second part of that Motion.
1010 (Utah 1973).

Amoss v. Bennion, 517 P.2d 1008,

In unusual circumstances, a reviewing court

may reassess witness credibility if the testimony is
"inherently improbable."
(Utah 1993).

State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984

The verdict will be reversed if no substantial

evidence, or insufficient evidence, supports it.

Crookston v.

Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991); Canyon Country
Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah 1989).

Evidence is

insufficient if it "so clearly preponderates in favor of the
appellant that reasonable people would not differ on the
outcome of the case/' Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products, Inc., 939
P.2d 1213, 1216 (Utah App. 1997).3

3

A new trial should be

It may be of interest to the Court that it is the judgment on the jury's
verdict in Ortiz that appears to have been appealed, rather than a denial of

6

ordered only in those rare cases when a jury verdict is
manifestly against the weight of the evidence.

E.g.,

Goddard

v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984).
This issue was preserved in the District Court
proceedings by Ms. Holmstrom's submission of Plaintiff's Motion
for Partial Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New
Trial on Remaining Issues or, in the Alternative, for New Trial
on All Issues (R. at 899-901), her Memorandum in support of
that Motion (R. at 907-922), her submission of her Reply
Memorandum in support of that Motion (R. at 938-946), and at
oral argument (Tr. of February 25, 1999 proceedings, at 1-25)
on that Motion.
III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE: FACTS AND SIGNIFICANT
PROCEEDINGS IN DISTRICT COURT LITIGATION

On September 29, 1993, Cheryl Holmstrom, the plaintiffappellant, was driving, in a Nissan Stanza, westbound on
Division Lane approaching Park Street, in Salt Lake City
Tr. Vol. Ill, 504-08).

{E.g.,

Defendant-appellee Joseph Hyatt, while

in the course and scope of his employment with defendant C.R.
England, Inc., driving a semi-tractor (without a trailer
attached), was attempting to make a right turn from northbound
Park Street onto Division Lane {E.g.,

Tr. Vol. II, 122-24).

the plaintiff's motion for new trial (if such a motion was even filed), and
that the ultimate standard of appellate review seems to be, in either event,
"sufficiency of the evidence."
n

The two vehicles collided.

Ms. Holmstrom suffered serious

orthopedic injuries, including foot and ankle fractures, and
incurred, for treatment of those injuries alone, health care
expenses in a stipulated amount in excess of $44,000.00.
761.

R. at

Ms. Holmstrom allegedly sustained, in addition to her

physical injuries, post-traumatic stress disorder.
Ms. Holmstrom brought this action seeking to recover for
her injuries and damages suffered, sustained, and incurred in
the subject collision, alleging that Mr. Hyatt (an acknowledged
agent of C.R. England, Inc.), was negligent and that
Mr. Hyatt's negligence was a proximate cause of damages
sustained by Ms. Holmstrom.

R. at 1-4.

C.R. England, Inc. and

Mr. Hyatt denied that Mr. Hyatt was negligent, denied that his
negligence was a proximate cause of any of Ms. Holmstrom's
damages, and contended that Ms. Holmstrom was negligent and
that her negligence was the proximate cause of her damages.
at 6-9.

R.

At the conclusion of the case presented by C.R.

England, Inc. and Mr. Hyatt, Ms. Holmstrom moved for directed
verdict on her contentions regarding Mr. Hyatt's negligence and
the proximate cause connection between that negligence and her
sustaining of injuries and damages.
District Court denied that Motion.

Tr. Vol. V, 831-32.
Id.,

The

833.

The District Court (accepting the argument of counsel for
C.R. England, Inc. and Mr. Hyatt) refused to give a jury
8

instruction, prepared by Ms. Holmstrom, to the effect that
negligent conduct could be based on the negligent selection of
a route (in addition to driving conduct itself).

Tr. Vol. V,

808-14.
The District Court also (at the urging of counsel for C.R.
England, Inc. and Mr. Hyatt) declined to give the jury
instruction, prepared by Ms. Holmstrom, dealing with proximate
causation in the "sudden peril" context.

Tr. Vol. V, 819-22.

The jury determined that Mr. Hyatt was negligent but that
his negligence was not a proximate cause of any of
Ms. Holmstrom's damages.

R. at 716-17.

Having made that no-

proximate-cause determination, it answered no more questions on
the Verdict.
The District Court then entered Judgment, on the Verdict,
in favor of C.R. England, Inc. and Mr. Hyatt.

R. at 895-97.

Ms. Holmstrom then filed her Motion for Partial Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict and for New Trial on Remaining
Issues or, in the Alternative, for New Trial on All Issues,
contending that she was entitled either (1) to judgment, as a
matter of law, on the proximate cause claim rejected by the
jury, and a new trial on the remaining issues; or (2) a new
trial on all issues.

R. at 899-901.

That Motion was based on

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50 (b), proposition that
Ms. Holmstrom was entitled to a finding, as a matter of law,
o

that Mr. Hyatt's negligence was a proximate cause of her
sustaining damages and, alternatively, on the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)(6) proposition that there was
insufficient evidence, given the law on which the jury was
instructed, to sustain the no-proximate-cause verdict.
The District Court by its Order denied that Motion (R. at
983-85), and this Appeal ensued.
IV.
1.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The District Court committed error in refusing to

include, in its charge to the jury, Ms. Holmstrom's proposed
instruction dealing with the negligent selection of an unsafe
route.

That instruction was central to Ms. Holmstrom's theory

of the case, and the District Court's erroneous refusal was
prejudicial and constitutes reversible error.
2.

The District Court committed error in refusing to

include, in its charge to the jury, the "sudden peril"
proximate cause instruction proposed by Ms. Holmstrom.

That

proposed instruction was central to Ms. Holmstrom's theory of
the case, and the District Court's refusal to include it was
prejudicial and reversible error.
3.

The District Court committed reversible error in

denying Ms. Holmstrom's Motion for a partial judgment
notwithstanding the verdict with respect to the proximate cause
connection between Mr. Hyatt's negligence and Ms. Holmstrom's
10

sustaining of damages, inasmuch as no reasonable jury could
have found that no proximate causation had been established.
4.

The District Court committed reversible error in

denying Ms. Holmstrom's Motion for New Trial on all issues,
inasmuch as there was insufficient evidence to support that
verdict.
V.
A.

ARGUMENT

IT WAS ERROR FOR THE DISTRICT COURT TO REFUSE TO GIVE
MS. HOLMSTROM'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE
SELECTION OF AN UNSAFE ROUTE. GIVEN MS. HOLMSTROM'S
THEORY OF THE CASE AND THE "SUBSTANTIAL ROLE" ASPECT
OF PROXIMATE CAUSATION LAW ON WHICH THE JURY WAS
INSTRUCTED, THE DISTRICT COURT'S FAILURE TO GIVE THAT
INSTRUCTION LIKELY AFFECTED THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL,
AND THE ERROR WAS THUS PREJUDICIAL.

Ms. Holmstrom proposed, consistent with her theory of the
case, the following jury instruction:
You may find, depending on the facts and circumstances of
this case, either or both drivers negligent not only for
their driving conduct itself but also, if he or she or
both knew the route taken was hazardous, for taking that
route.
R. at 778.
instruction.

The District Court refused to give that
See argument and ruling appearing at Tr. Vol. V,

808-14.
Throughout this litigation, in the pre-trial phase of this
case, and at trial (e.g., Tr. Vol. II, 135-40; 175-79; 196-97),
Ms. Holmstrom developed, as one of her primary theories of
liability against the defendants, the proposition that the
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route selected by Mr. Hyatt, the acknowledged agent of C.R.
England, given his knowledge of the danger of trying to execute
his right turn (as a function of the blind S-curve through
which Ms. Holmstrom was moving when he began his turn, as a
function of the foliage right near the corner, and as a
function of the presence of old cars on the corner) (see, e.g.,
Tr. Vol. II, 122-35), was unsafe.

Ms. Holmstrom brought to the

District Court's attention, by citations (R. at 778) on the
face of her proposed jury instruction, and during the jury
instruction conference (Tr. Vol. V, 808-14), cases that support
the giving of that instruction.

Those cases are the following:

Baker v. Decker, 212 P.2d 679 (Utah 1949); Wightman v.
Bettilyon's, Inc., 390 P.2d 120 (Utah 1964); Wold v. Ogden
City, 258 P.2d 453 (Utah 1953); Blacconeri v. Aguayo, 478
N.E.2d 546, 550 (111. App. 1985).
There is nothing, in law or logic, and contrary to the
District Court's determination, that suggests that the
principle recognized in those cases (which are pedestrian cases
in the contributory negligence realm) should not apply to the
negligence of an operator of a motor vehicle.

The District

Court, in contravention of its duty, as a matter of settled
Utah law (e.g., State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah
1998); Startin v. Madsen, 237 P.2d 835 (Utah 1951)), to
instruct the jury fairly on Ms. Holmstrom's theory of the case,
12

erred by refusing to include the proposed instruction in its
charge to the jury.
The significance of the District Court's error in refusing
to include the proposed instruction cannot, in the context of
this Appeal, be overstated.

As explained hereinabove, the jury

found, by its Special Verdict (R. at 716-18), that Mr. Hyatt
was negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate cause
of any of Ms. Holmstrom's injuries.

The proximate cause

instruction, to the giving of which the parties stipulated,
provided as follows:
If you determine that either Mr. Hyatt or Ms. Holmstrom
was negligent, then you must also decide whether that
negligence was a "proximate cause" of any of
Ms. Holmstrom's injuries.
To find "proximate cause," you must first find a cause and
effect relationship between any such negligence and any of
Ms. Holmstrom's injuries. But cause and effect alone is
not enough. For an injury to be proximately caused by
negligence, two other factors must be present:
1.

The negligence must have played a substantial role in
causing the injury; and

2.

A reasonable person could foresee that some injury
could result from the negligence.

R. at 756 (emphasis added).

The defendants never contested the

proposition that Ms. Holmstrom had sustained serious orthopedic
injuries in the subject collision.

The parties stipulated, and

the jury was so instructed (R. at 761), that Ms. Holmstrom had
incurred at least $44,257.28 in medical expenses as results of

1 O

the collision.

Nor have the defendants contested the

proposition that a reasonable person could foresee that some
injury could result from the subject negligence of Mr. Hyatt.
The only reasonable conclusion, given the uncontroverted facts
of this case, is that the jury determined that Mr. Hyatt's
negligence, found, as a fact, by the jury, did not play a
"substantial role" in causing any of Ms. Holmstrom's injuries.
A review of the defendants' Memorandum (R. at 923-931; see,
especially, R. at 927) in opposition to Ms. Holmstrom's posttrial Motion verifies that defendants agree with that
proposition.

For C.R. England and Mr. Hyatt did not even argue

that the jury could have reached its "no-proximate"
determination on any basis other than the supposed lack of a
"substantial role" connection between Mr. Hyatt's negligence
and any of Ms. Holmstrom's injuries.
In the absence of the District Court's instruction on this
particular of the negligence of Mr. Hyatt, it is apparent, as a
matter of reasonable inference, that the jury determined that
all Mr. Hyatt did wrong was, being familiar with the "blind
turn" he was attempting to execute, attempted to make the turn
anyway {e.g.,

Tr. Vol. Ill, 124), and then moved across the

center of the road and partially blocked Ms. Holmstrom's lane
of travel (e.g., id.,

147). The jury should have been

instructed that his selection of an unsafe route (the one he
14

took —

down Park Street to Division Lane —

rather than, for

example, his simply going down 27th South another one-half block
to 5th East and turning right (if he had done so he wouldn't
have had to deal with the S-turn) {e.g.,

id.,

constitute an additional act of negligence.

136-37)), could
It is apparent

that the jury, in the absence of this instruction, determined
that Mr. Hyatt's negligence, when compared against the supposed
negligence of Ms. Holmstrom, was not "substantial."
Ms. Holmstrom recognizes that error is "harmless" (Rule 61
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; e.g.,

State v. Perez, 924

P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1996)) when it does not negatively impact
the substantial rights of a party.

Ms. Holmstrom also

understands that Rule 61 and settled Utah case law place upon
an appellant not only the burden of showing that an error
occurred but that that error was substantial and prejudicial.
E.g.,

Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 154 (Utah 1987).

Ms. Holmstrom also understands that she must show a reasonable
likelihood that, without the error, the outcome would have been
different.

E.g.,

12 (Utah 1999).

Tingey v. Christensen, 373 Utah Adv. Rep. 10,
Ms. Holmstrom also brings to the Court's

attention the following rule of law stated in Watters v.
Querry, 626 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1981):
The well-recognized general rule entitles a party to have
[her] theory of the case submitted to the jury. Where
there is evidence advanced to support a party's theory of
1R

the case, it is prejudicial error for the trial court to
fail to instruct thereon.
(Emphasis added.)

See, also, Biswell v. Duncan, 724 P.2d 80,

88 (Utah App. 1987) : "Failure to give requested jury
instruction constitutes reversible error ... if the omission ...
insufficiently ... advises the jury on the law."

(Emphasis

added.)
Ms. Holmstrom contends that the most peculiar result at
trial was rooted, in substantial part, in the District Court's
refusal to instruct on an important part of Ms. Holmstrom's
theory of the case and that the rules of law set forth in
Watters and Biswell, as applied to the facts of this case,
mandate the conclusion that the District Court's error in
refusing sufficiently to instruct the jury on Ms. Holmstrom's
theory of the case amounted to reversible error and that,
accordingly, Ms. Holmstrom is entitled to a reversal and either
a partial or plenary new trial.
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE THE "SUDDEN
PERIL" PROXIMATE CAUSE INSTRUCTION PROPOSED BY
MS. HOLMSTROM WAS ERROR. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF
THIS CASE, THAT ERROR WAS NOT HARMLESS, BUT
PREJUDICIAL, AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE
THE INSTRUCTION ENTITLES MS. HOLMSTROM TO A NEW
TRIAL.

The District Court refused to give, as worded, another
instruction proposed by Ms. Holmstrom.
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That was her proposed

"sudden peril" proximate cause instruction.

That proposed

instruction was worded as follows:
You may appropriately determine that Mr. Hyatt's
negligence was a proximate cause of Ms. Holmstrom's
injuries if, but not only if, you find: (1) that Mr. Hyatt
negligently caused a situation of sudden peril; and (2)
that Ms. Holmstrom, acting under the impulse of fear, made
an instinctive effort to escape; and (3) in so doing,
Ms. Holmstrom sustained injuries, even though it might now
appear that Ms. Holmstrom's attempt to escape was unwise
or should have been made differently.
R. at 779.

This proposed instruction was a variation on "MUJI"

stock instruction 4.3, which is worded as follows:
If you find: (1) that the defendant negligently caused a
situation of sudden peril; and (2) that the person in
peril, acting under the impulse of fear, made an
instinctive effort to escape; and (3) in so doing, that
person sustained injuries or injured a third person, then
you may find that defendant's negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury, even though it might now appear that
the attempt to escape was unwise or should have been made
differently.
(Emphasis added.)
It was uncontested, as explained hereinabove, that
Mr. Hyatt started making his sweeping right-hand turn, which
would cause him at least partially to block Ms. Holmstrom's
lane of travel, when he could not see her, or anyone else who
might be coming along, traveling westbound on Division.4

It is

also uncontested that the C.R. England truck being driven by
Mr. Hyatt was moving to Ms. Holmstrom's right when she first

See, e.g., the factual recitation, including record citations, set forth at
34-36,
infra.

recognized the emergency; that this was a "dynamic" situation;
and that it took Mr. Hyatt time and distance to bring his truck
to a stop (e.g., testimony of Ronald Woolley, defendant's
liability expert, Tr. Vol. IV, 686; 713-18).

It is also

uncontested that it took Ms. Holmstrom time to perceive and
react to the fact that the truck was moving into her lane
(e.g., id.,

673). It is also uncontested that both vehicles

were across the center of the road when the collision occurred.
See, e.g., Trial Exhibits P-10 and D-19.

There was also

unrebutted testimony that Ms. Holmstrom tried to go left,
thinking the truck would continue to move in front of her and
further block her path of travel (e.g., testimony of
Ms. Holmstrom, Tr. Vol. Ill, 510-11), but that, because her
tires locked up in response to the braking attempt, she
continued going straight (e.g., testimony of Ronald Probert,
Ms. Holmstrom's accident reconstructionist, Tr. Vol. II, 22526).

It is also uncontested that there was room for

Ms. Holmstrom to get around the truck, where it ultimately came
to rest, if she had gone to the right (e.g., testimony of
defendants' Dr. Woolley, Tr. Vol. IV, 660-61).
It thus appears that Ms. Holmstrom was entitled to a
sudden peril proximate cause instruction.
did not submit the MUJI instruction verbatim,

The reason that she
as she explained,

through her counsel, in the conference on jury instructions
18

(Tr. Vol. V, 819-20) is that the stock MUJI instruction, given
its ambiguous wording (set forth, supra,

at 17), may fairly be

read to mean, as applied to this case, that the only way the
jury could find a proximate cause connection between
Mr. Hyatt's negligence and any of Ms. Holmstrom's injuries was
if the jury should find that this was, indeed, a "sudden peril"
situation.

Accordingly, and out of recognition that

Ms. Holmstrom should not, as a matter of law or logic, be that
limited with respect to her chances of prevailing on the
proximate cause issue, Ms. Holmstrom submitted the modified
instruction that included the "if, but not only if" language.
Ms. Holmstrom submits that this modified "sudden peril"
instruction made perfect sense; fit the facts of this case;
was, unlike the MUJI form instruction, not ambiguous; and
should have been given by the District Court, consistent with
its duty fairly to instruct the jury on Ms. Holmstrom's theory
of the case.

As a review of the colloquy regarding this

proposed instruction (Tr. Vol. V, 820) will make clear, the
District Court expressed the view that the proposed instruction
was not clear and needed to be reworded, and counsel for
Mr. Hyatt and C.R. England expressed the view, with which the
District Court agreed (id.,

821) that the instruction, if

given, needed to include some counterpart language that the
jury should disregard the instruction if the jury should find
1Q

that Ms. Holmstrom herself caused the "sudden peril."
Ms. Holmstrom and the defendants were unable to agree to
satisfactory alternative language and, accordingly, the
District Court did not give the proposed instruction.
Ms. Holmstrom submits that the instruction she proposed, unlike
the MUJI instruction, was clear and in accordance with the law,
that the proposed instruction did not need to be reworded, that
the District Court was in error in its determination that the
defendants were entitled to the language they requested, and
that it was prejudicial error, in the circumstances of this
case, for the District Court to refuse to give the instruction
as proposed.
Again, as with the negligent route selection instruction
discussed hereinabove, Ms. Holmstrom was entitled, pursuant to
settled Utah law (see, e.g., discussion of Watters and Biswell
cases appearing at 15-16, supra),

to have the jury fairly

instructed on her theory of the case.5

As explained

hereinabove, the proposed sudden peril instruction completely
fit the facts of this case.

It was all over the trial of this

case that Ms. Holmstrom was faced with an emergency not of her
doing when Mr. Hyatt turned in front of her.

5

It was also

The Court may deem it appropriate, as it weighs the question of whether the
District Court's refusal to give two instructions central to Ms. Holmstrom's
theory of the case constituted prejudicial error, to consider the cumulative
effect of the District Court's refusals.
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uncontested that, as things turned out (with the truck stopping
rather than continuing its wide, sweeping turn), there was room
for Ms. Holmstrom to go to the right. And it certainly thus
eventuated that Ms. Holmstrom's attempted escape route turned
out to be ill-advised.

The District Court's failure to give

the instruction submitted by Ms. Holmstrom was erroneous.
Because of the jury's "No" answer to the proximate cause
question, was not harmless but prejudicial error; and
Ms. Holmstrom is, accordingly, entitled to a new trial.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DENYING MS. HOLMSTROM'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT WITH RESPECT TO THE
PROXIMATE CAUSE ISSUE.

At the conclusion of the defendants' case, Ms. Holmstrom
moved (pursuant to Rule 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure) for a partial directed verdict, contending that, as
matters of law, the District Court should determine that
defendant Hyatt was negligent and that that negligence was a
proximate cause of at least some of Ms. Holmstrom's damages.
Tr. Vol. V, 831-32.

The District Court denied that motion.

As

stated hereinabove, the jury determined that Mr. Hyatt was
negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of
any of Ms. Holmstrom's injuries.
Ms. Holmstrom urges this Court to rule that she was
entitled to a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict

01

based on the evidence presented at trial.

If the Court grants

this requested relief, the appropriate remand order would be
for a new trial on questions of Ms. Holmstrom's negligence; the
proximate cause connection between her negligence, if any, and
her injuries; respective percentages of causal fault, if she
had any, between Mr. Hyatt's negligence and her negligence, if
any; and, if her causal fault, if any, should be determined to
be less than 50% of the total, the amounts of damages sustained
by her as results of the subject collision.
A directed verdict is appropriate only when the trial
court is able to conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable
jurors would not differ, based on the law and on the evidence
E.g.,

presented, on the proposition to be determined.

Management Comm. of Graystone Pine Homeowners' Ass'n v.
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982).

In

ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
the trial court is governed by the same rules as when it is
ruling on a motion for directed verdict.
Mkts., 431 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1967).

E.g.,

Koer v. Mayfair

The purpose of Rule

50(b) (the rule dealing with motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict) is to allow a trial judge to
permit a question to go to the jury and then, if the jury's
verdict on that question is contrary to the moving party's
position, to re-examine the issue when there is more time for
22

d e l i b e r a t i o n , and then to determine whether the question should
have gone to the jury in the f i r s t place.
P.2d 855, 855-56 (Utah 1953).

Roche v. Zee, 264

The question here i s whether

reasonable j u r o r s could determine t h a t Mr. H y a t t ' s negligence
was not a proximate cause of at l e a s t some of Ms. Holmstrom's
damages.

This Court's examination of the issues should focus

primarily on two t h i n g s :

(1) the uncontested nature of the

c o l l i s i o n , as described hereinabove; and (2) the law of
proximate causation, as embodied in jury i n s t r u c t i o n No. 34 (R.
at 767, agreed to by the p a r t i e s p r i o r to t r i a l , a copy of
which i s attached hereto in the Addendum, at 003, and which i s
also set forth, verbatim, supra,

at 13). 6

There was simply, on

the facts of t h i s case, no question on which reasonable minds
could differ

(1) t h a t there was a cause-and-effeet

relationship

between Mr. H y a t t ' s negligence and, at l e a s t , Ms. Holmstrom's
orthopedic i n j u r i e s ;

(2) t h a t defendant Hyatt's negligence

played a s u b s t a n t i a l role in causing those i n j u r i e s ; and (3)
t h a t a reasonable person could foresee t h a t some injury could
r e s u l t from t h a t negligence.

6

See, a l s o , i n s t r u c t i o n s nos. 33 (R. a t 755) and 35 (R. a t 757) reproduced
in t h e Addendum a t , r e s p e c t i v e l y , 004 and 005, s e t t i n g f o r t h , r e s p e c t i v e l y ,
t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e r e can be more than one proximate cause of given
i n j u r i e s , and t h a t , in order t o e s t a b l i s h proximate c a u s a t i o n , i t i s not
n e c e s s a r y t h a t a l l of Ms. Holmstrom's claimed damages be determined t o be
a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e n e g l i g e n c e in q u e s t i o n .

On the facts of this case it was, and is, clear that, but
for Mr. Hyatt's negligence —
fact —

determined by the jury to be a

the collision would not have occurred, Ms. Holmstrom

would not have been injured, and Ms. Holmstrom would not have
sustained her orthopedic injuries and incurred in excess
$44,000 in medical expenses.

of

On the facts of this case —

unlike others where, for example, numerous actors are involved
so that a given defendant can fairly argue that his conduct was
of de minimis

significance —

it was, and is, clear that

Mr. Hyatt's negligence played a substantial role in causing
Ms. Holmstrom's orthopedic injuries.
Another category of cases in which proximate cause is a
real factual issue involves the passage of time between a
defendant's negligent act and the sustaining of injuries.
is not one of those cases.

This

It is indisputable that, in this

case, at least some of Mr. Hyatt's negligence and the collision
occurred virtually simultaneously.

Also, on the facts of this

case, it was, and is, clear that any reasonable person could
foresee that some injury could result from negligent conduct
such as that engaged in by Mr. Hyatt, who turned, without being
able to see whether anyone was coming, who made a wide turn,
who drove across the center of the road, and who, consistent
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with an instruction that was given,7 failed to yield the rightof-way to Ms. Holmstrom.

No-proximate-cause determinations

typically come in situations where all damages are in dispute
(as in situations involving low-speed rear-end collisions
and/or situations involving pre-existing medical conditions
where the medical evidence is mixed), and in multi-actor and
substantial passage-of-time situations.

Ms. Holmstrom's

counsel's research has unearthed no Utah or other case
involving factual situations and issues like this one, and in
which a jury found a defendant to be negligent, in which a
jury's no-proximate-cause determination-has been upheld.8

This

Court should, as a matter of law, determine that Mr. Hyatt's
negligence was a proximate cause of at least some of
Ms. Holmstrom's damages and order (such a result seems
logically to follow) that a new trial be conducted on all
issues other than Mr. Hyatt's negligence and the proximate

7

Jury Instruction number 25.5 (R. at 747) provided:
Utah law provides that an operator of a vehicle approaching an
intersection not regulated by an official traffic-control
device, from a street that does not continue beyond the
intersection, shall yield the right-of-way to the operator of
any vehicle on the intersecting street.

8

For a remarkably similar case, in which an appellate court reversed a trial
court's denial of a motion for j.n.o.v.,
on the proximate cause question,
see Hardison v. Bushnell, 22 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Cal. App. 1993), discussed, at
greater length, at 46-47, infra.
For a discussion of cases that support the
proposition that Ms. Holmstrom is, at a minimum, entitled to a new trial on
all issues, please see pages 47-48,
infra.

causation connection between his negligence and Ms. Holmstrom's
damages.
D.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DENYING MS. HOLMSTROM' S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON ALL
ISSUES.

If this Court rejects Ms. Holmstrom's argument, set forth
in the immediately preceding part C. of this Argument section
of this Brief, that the District Court committed reversible
error in denying her Motion for Partial Directed Verdict on the
proximate cause question, and if this Court determines that the
District Court did not prejudicially err with respect to its
refusal to give either of Ms. Holmstrom's proposed jury
instructions discussed hereinabove, this Court should consider
the proposition that there was, nonetheless, insufficient
evidence to support the jury's no-proximate-cause determination
and should remand for a new trial on all issues.
Utah trial courts are appropriately vested with great
discretion to fix, in the interest of justice, the mistakes of
juries.

The Court is respectfully urged to consider the Utah

Supreme Court case of Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817
P.2d 789, 804 (Utah 1991) ("The trial judge is free to grant ...
a motion for a new trial if it is reasonable to conclude that
the jury erred."

"... a trial judge may properly grant a new

trial under Rule 59(a) (6) when he ... can reasonably conclude
that the verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence
26

or that there is insufficient evidence to justify the verdict ...
Id.

at 799, n. 9); as well as the older case of Efco

Distributing, Inc. v. Perrin, 412 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966):
Notwithstanding the admitted virtues of the jury system, it
must be recognized that as in all human institutions,
juries are subject to error. For a jury verdict to be
regarded as completely beyond control or correction would
permit the jury itself in some instances to be an
instrument of despotic action rather than of the law and
order it is purposed to preserve. For this reason it is
essential that there exist in the court supervisory
authority to rectify mistakes.
If it clearly appears that there has been a miscarriage of
justice because the jury has refused to accept credible,
uncontradicted evidence where there is no rational basis
for rejecting it, or it is plain to be seen that the jury
has acted under a misconception of proven facts, or has
misapplied or disregarded the law, or where it appears that
the verdict was the result of passion or prejudice, it is
both the prerogative and the duty of the court to set aside
the verdict and grant a new trial. This does not have the
effect of depriving a party of a fair trial by jury, but in
reality is a safeguard to assure it.
Id.

at 617 (emphasis added).
It is not important to the present discussion that in both

Crookston and Efco, the Supreme Court found that there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding and, thus,
upheld the trial court's denial of the losing party's motion
for new trial.

The Court should focus on the law, as laid down

by the Supreme Court, setting forth Utah trial courts' power
and duty regarding trials in cases (such as this, regarding the
jury's "no proximate cause" finding) where there is not sufficient evidence to support a jury's factual finding.

The Court

may and must, in such cases, fix things so that a party may
have a second trial before a jury that cannot be expected to
err as did the first.
As stated above, Ms. Holmstrom!s undersigned counsel's
research has unearthed no case, similar on its facts to the
instant case, in which a jury's no-proximate-cause
determination has stood up through the post-trial motion and
appellate review process.
As stated above, the jury instruction setting forth the
legal definition of proximate cause given by the Court was
agreed to by the parties.

A careful reading of that instruc-

tion, in light of the dynamics of the subject collision and the
evidence presented at trial, makes it very clear that there was
"insufficient evidence" (the Rule 59(a)(6) standard) to support
the jury's "no proximate cause" determination.
Ms. Holmstrom through her counsel understands that she is
required, in pursuit of her contention that the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury's no-proximate-cause verdict,
to marshal the evidence in support of the verdict.

E.g.,

State

v. Benvenuto, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1999); Child v.
Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433-34 (Utah 1998); Von Hake v. Thomas,
705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985).

As suggested hereinabove, there

is, to her undersigned counsel's knowledge, literally no
evidence which would support a reasonable jury's determination
that there was not a proximate cause connection between
Mr. Hyatt's negligence and the sustaining of injuries and
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damages by Ms. Holmstrom, but Ms. Holmstrom's counsel w i l l
nonetheless do t h e i r best to bring any such possible evidence
to the Court's a t t e n t i o n , p r i o r to s e t t i n g forth the contrary
evidence. 9
1.

EVIDENCE CONCEIVABLY IN SUPPORT OF THE VERDICT

Larry Jones,
England,

the Assistant

testified

D i r e c t o r of S a f e t y f o r

that the subject

intersection

C.R.

i s "no

less

d a n g e r o u s t h a n any o t h e r s , " and t h a t " [ t ] h e r e i s some t h i n g s

to

consider here but a l l i n t e r s e c t i o n s are i n h e r e n t l y dangerous

in

one way o r a n o t h e r "

(Tr. Vol. I I ,

R o n a l d L. P r o b e r t ,
expert,

a t 184) .

Ms. H o l m s t r o m ' s a c c i d e n t

a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t t h e r e i s a v e r y good

reconstruction
likelihood

[ b a s e d s o l e l y on what became t h e p o i n t of i m p a c t ]

that

c o l l i s i o n would h a v e h a p p e n e d e v e n i f Mr. H y a t t had
c o m p l e t e l y i n h i s own l a n e of t r a v e l

(Tr. V o l . I I ,

the

stayed
250);

that

i f Ms. Holmstrom had s t a r t e d h e r emergency r e a c t i o n t o

the

t r u c k coming i n t o h e r l a n e a h a l f

would

h a v e b e e n no c o l l i s i o n

[id.,

second e a r l i e r t h e r e

255); that i t

is "plausible"

Mr. H y a t t was s t o p p e d f o r a c o u p l e of s e c o n d s b e f o r e

9

that

impact

The Court may deem i t a p p r o p r i a t e t o c o n s i d e r the e v i d e n t i a r y r e c o r d
r e f e r e n c e d in t h i s p a r t (pages 29-42) of t h i s Brief i n connection not only
with t h i s s e c t i o n D of t h i s Argument, but a l s o in connection with t h e
foregoing s e c t i o n C (addressing t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court
committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r in denying Ms. Holmstrom's Motion for D i r e c t e d
Verdict on t h e proximate cause i s s u e ) . Please n o t e , a l s o , t h a t t h i s
e v i d e n t i a r y m a r s h a l l i n g a t t e m p t s t o d e a l only with t h e " s u b s t a n t i a l r o l e "
a s p e c t of t h e no-proximate cause d e t e r m i n a t i o n and not with every a s p e c t of
t h e negligence of e i t h e r Mr. Hyatt or Ms. Holmstrom.

{id.,

2 5 9 ) ; t h a t Ms. Holmstrom had an o p t i o n t o go t o t h e r i g h t

[ r a t h e r t h a n brake and t r y t o go l e f t ]

(id.,

261);

that

Ms. Holmstrom could have s t a y e d i n her own l a n e (id.,
t h a t t h e England t r u c k was " h a r d t o m i s s " (id.,
t o s e e " (id.,

262);

268) and " e a s y

269).

Dr. Mark R i n d f l e s h ,

a d o c t o r who did an " i n d e p e n d e n t "

medical examination on Ms. Holmstrom, t e s t i f i e d

that

Ms. Holmstrom t o l d him t h a t a t r u c k appeared i n f r o n t of h e r
and i t happened so q u i c k l y t h a t she w a s n ' t s u r e what happened
(Tr. Vol. I l l ,

384) .

Ray Gurule 1 0 , a S a l t Lake C i t y S a n i t a t i o n Department
employee, whose j o b i t was, on t h e day of t h e c o l l i s i o n ,
empty garbage cans i n t h e immediate v i c i n i t y of t h e

to

collision,

t e s t i f i e d t h a t a compact c a r might have been a b l e t o go between
t h e n o r t h e r n m o s t p a r t of t h e t r u c k , a t i t s stopped p o s i t i o n ,
and t h e curb t o t h e n o r t h of t h a t p o s i t i o n
right]

(Tr. Vol. I l l ,

421), and t h a t i t d o e s n ' t appear t h a t

Ms. Holmstrom moved r i g h t or l e f t
l e f t t h e S-curve

(id.,

[to Ms. Holmstrom's

i n D i v i s i o n Lane a f t e r

she

426).

Mr. G u r u l e ' s l a s t name was m i s t a k e n l y l i s t e d by t h e c o u r t r e p o r t e r as
"Argule"; Ms. Holmstrom's undersigned counsel a p o l o g i z e s for not a s k i n g
Mr. Gurule t o s p e l l h i s name for t h e r e c o r d ; i t should a l s o be noted t h a t
t h e r e a r e many " i n a u d i b l e " r e f e r e n c e s i n t h e t r a n s c r i p t and many m i s t a k e s in
t r a n s c r i p t i o n ; t h e t r a n s c r i p t was p r e p a r e d from t h e v i d e o t a p e r e c o r d i n g of
t h e D i s t r i c t Court p r o c e e d i n g s ; and, i f t h e r e i s any doubt i n t h e mind of
t h e Court with r e s p e c t t o t h e a c t u a l t e s t i m o n y of any w i t n e s s , i t might be
a d v i s a b l e for t h e Court t o review t h e a c t u a l v i d e o t a p e .
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Ms. Holmstrom herself testified that it is possible that,
between the time she first saw the truck starting its turn and
the time she realized it was coming into her lane of travel,
she glanced at the clock or the speedometer of her car (Tr.
Vol. Ill, 518); that she does not recall slowing down after
seeing the truck starting its turn and before realizing it was
coming into her lane {id.,

541); that she does not believe she

moved to her right after beginning to see the truck start its
turn {id.);

and that she probably told Dr. Rindflesh she was

going 25-30 m.p.h. when the truck appeared and that it all
happened so fast she wasn't quite sure what happened

{id.,

564) .
Jim Johnson, Ms. Holmstrom's boyfriend at that time and a
person who came to the scene shortly after the collision
occurred, testified that it was "goofy" that Ms. Holmstrom's
car was left of center at the time of collision, that she
"shouldn't be there" and that it "doesn't make sense" (Tr. Vol.
IV, 595).
Defendant Joseph Hyatt testified that when he first saw
Cheryl Holmstrom's vehicle coming out of the S-curve it was
slightly left of center (Tr. Vol. IV, 633); that he'd made the
same turn several times in the past without any problem, that
he believed that he was able to make the turn safely and that
he did not want to make a "button-hook" turn from 5th East onto
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South, and that the subject intersection was "no dangerous"

than any other [id.,

609-10; 617).

Ronald Woolley, defendants' accident reconstructionist
liability expert, testified that Ms. Holmstrom had ample time
and distance to react to and avoid the England truck, when,
coming out of the S-curve, she first saw the truck (Tr. Vol.
IV, 655); that there was [at that instant] time to steer to the
right to get around the truck, time to slow down and give
herself a better ability to steer, and time to come to a
complete stop before arriving at what became the point of
impact (id.);

that there is no indication, from the physical

evidence, that Ms. Holmstrom tried to swerve either left or
right prior to impact (id.,

655-56); that there is no
(id.,

indication that the truck was still moving on impact

659); that Ms. Holmstrom had ample distance to go to the right
around what became the truck's resting place (id.,

660-661);

that if Ms. Holmstrom had hit her brakes .53 second sooner than
she did there would not have been a collision (id.,

663-64);

that it was "an error in judgment" on Ms. Holmstrom's part not
to track the truck from the time she first saw it until it
actually stopped (id.,

687); that Ms. Holmstrom made a

"mistake" in not being a defensive driver after first noticing
that the truck was turning [when it was not, at that instant,
moving into her lane but in the appropriate lane and in the
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direction opposite of the direction she was traveling]

[id.,

688); that, if Ms. Holmstrom tried to go left when she saw the
truck moving into her lane, that was an "error" "in judgment"
[id.,

726); that Ms. Holmstrom squandered "about a second" of

the time she had available to her from the time she first saw
the truck turning [when it was not, at that instant, moving
into her lane but in the appropriate lane and in the direction
opposite of the direction she was traveling] {id.,

731); and

that if Ms. Holmstrom never took her eyes off the truck from
the time she saw it until the time of the collision, "that
would fall into the category of just bad driver judgment"

{id.,

735) .
Reed Garff, the investigating officer, testified that
Ms. Holmstrom's car was going straight west at impact (Tr. Vol.
V, 773); that Ms. Holmstrom told him she looked at her clock
and then looked up and "there the truck was" {id.,

778); that

Ms. Holmstrom was considerably left of center at the point of
impact {id.,

779); that his opinion regarding Ms. Holmstrom's

driving conduct is that she was not paying attention to where
she was going and "was watching her clock" {id.,
Mr. Hyatt was trying to prevent the accident {id.,

779); that
779-80);

that, at the time he did his investigation, the fact that the
truck was over the center of the road and blocking part of the
westbound lane "didn't seem like the cause and it wasn't

1Q1)11 (emphasis added); and

considered a factor in it" [id.,

that, although he does not think it's unreasonable for people
to glance down at a speedometer or to glance down at a clock,
that "causes a lot of accidents" (id.,
2.

802).

EVIDENCE CONTRARY TO THE VERDICT

Defendant Joseph Hyatt testified that he was familiar with
the subject intersection (Tr. Vol. II, 123); that he knew that
this was a blind intersection for people, like himself, making
a right turn from Park onto Division (id.,

124); that a blind

intersection constitutes a dangerous condition (id.,

124); that

the S-curve created a situation for the right-turning driver
[himself in this case] turning right onto Division where the
driver couldn't see traffic that was coming westbound on
Division (id.,

125); that the trees and the shrubs on the

southeast corner of the intersection were another thing that
made this a blind intersection and that he was aware, having
lived in the neighborhood for four years, of the presence of
those trees and shrubs (id.,

124); that he knew that he should

try to pick the safest route (id.,

136); that another route he

could have taken to do what he was doing (driving the truck
around the block) was simply to take 27th South to 5th East

11

(id.,

It may be important to note that Officer Garff also there testified that
"at that time [presumably, the time he did his investigation]" (emphasis
added), the fact that Mr. Hyatt was over the center of the road did not
enter into any of his decision.
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136); that, if he'd taken that route he could have avoided all
the problems with the blind intersection, with the S-curve and
with cars parked near the southeast corner of Division and Park
(id.,

136-37); that a person in the S-curve would be unable to

see Mr. Hyatt's truck creeping out onto Division Lane

{id.,

146); that he knew that the size of his truck was an issue
(id.,

146); that he knew that he would have to pull partially

into Ms. Holmstrom's lane of travel in order to complete his
turn (id.,

146); that he knew he had to yield the right of way

to traffic that had the right of way (id.,

147); that he

acknowledged that it wouldn't be safe for him to occupy
Ms. Holmstrom's lane of traffic with his truck unless he knew
there was no traffic coming (id.,

147-48); that he acknowledged

that he started his turn and encroached into the westbound lane
before he knew it was safe to do so (id.,

149-50); that he does

not believe that Ms. Holmstrom was acting unreasonably at the
time of the accident (id.

at 159); that he acknowledges having

said "something like" "I didn't see you, I didn't see you," to
Ms. Holmstrom immediately after the collision occurred

(id.,

161); that he acknowledges that Ms. Holmstrom had the right of
way (id.,

162); that he didn't see Ms. Holmstrom's vehicle

until it was coming out of the S-curve (id.,

166); that he was

stopped for only one or two seconds at the time of impact

(id.,

172); that he agrees that he had to yield the right of way (Tr.

Vol. IV, 626); that he agrees that he was not permitted to pull
into the oncoming lane of traffic unless he knew it was safe to
do so (id.);

that a very short period of time went by between

the time he first saw Ms. Holmstrom's vehicle and the time the
collision occurred {id.,

632); that it could have been as short

as a second that he was stopped before impact (id., 633).
Larry Jones, the Assistant Director of Safety for C.R.
England, testified that, if the intersection at which the
collision occurred was a dangerous intersection, Mr. Hyatt
should not have taken the route he took (Tr. Vol. II, 179).
Fred Henningson, a truck driver and driver evaluator for
C.R. England, Inc., testified that it makes sense that a C.R.
England driver who has a couple of different options to get to
the same spot should always take the safer one (Tr. Vol. II,
197), and that he agrees that a driver who has to make a wide
turn needs to be careful, because he's going across the center
of the road, so that he can see who is coming at all times
(id., 202).
Ronald Probert, Ms. Holmstrom's accident reconstruction
liability expert witness, testified that the front of the
England truck could have come to a rest as much as seven or
eight feet left of center for the direction it was traveling
(Tr. Vol. II, 219); that, in the aftermath of the subject
collision and while doing his work on the case, he noticed that
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cars traveling in the same direction Ms. Holmstrom was
traveling tended to travel left of center and that he saw a
police vehicle traveling in that fashion {id.,

220-21); that

[having to do with Ms. Holmstrom's account of her pre-impact
evasive maneuver] once brakes are locked, a driver loses her
steering capability [id.,

225-26), that in such a situation the

brake marks will show the vehicle still going straight

[id.,

226); that if Ms. Holmstrom was trying to go left at the time
the events were happening it suggests to him that she saw
movement of the England truck going to her right when she made
that maneuver {id.,

226); that Ms. Holmstrom tried to avoid the

accident, based on the physical evidence of the skid marks
{id.,

227); that there is nothing unreasonable about

Ms. Holmstrom's looking down at her speedometer or clock

{id.,

232); that Mr. Hyatt could have pulled out far enough into
Division Lane and stopped without going into the westbound part
of Division and be able to see clear through the S-curve and up
to 6th East {id.,

233-35); that Mr. Hyatt "had control of the

situation" {id.,

238); that Ms. Holmstrom was confronted with a

hazard not of her own doing; that she chose to go left thinking
that was her avenue of escape, and that if she had gone to the
right that would assume that she believed the truck was going
to stop {id.,

238); and that Division Lane does not have a

delineator center line {id.,

241).
0~7

Edward Paul France, Ph.D., Ms. Holmstrom's accident
reconstruction/human factors expert, testified that there is
nothing unreasonable about glancing down at a speedometer or a
clock as one is driving along (Tr. Vol. II, 297); that
Ms. Holmstrom began to notice the truck just as it was pulling
away from a stopped position, that the truck was then just
barely starting forward, that her expectation at that time
would be that the truck was going to initiate a right-hand turn
without intruding into her driving space and that she had to
make a judgment at the time she realized that the truck was
coming too far out and coming into what was for her the righthand lane of travel {id.,

298-99); that she perceived that

there was a clearing space opening up behind the truck for her
to go to the left and at the same time perceived that the truck
was going to continue to sweep north in its position, and that,
as she was processing all that information, the truck stopped
{id.,

299-300); that the truck was either stopped or almost

stopped at the time the collision occurred {id.,

300); that her

perception was, seeing the truck moving to her right, that the
area to her right was going to be closed and not open to her to
travel through {id.,

302); that, by the time the truck came far

enough into the road, there was not enough time for
Ms. Holmstrom to react and bring her car to a stop {id.,

313);

that Ms. Holmstrom had a very short time to make the judgment
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she had to make and that it was reasonable for her to assume
that the driver of the truck was going to do something to stay
out of her way {id.,

319); that it was reasonable for her to

see the truck crawling out into the roadway and think it was
not a threat to her; that the truck's conduct in coming across
the center of the road was something she did not expect; and
that her conduct was reasonable {id., 324).
Dr. Rindflesh testified that he did not ask Ms. Holmstrom
questions about when she perceived the truck or where the truck
was when she perceived it (Tr. Vol. Ill, 391).
Mr. Gurule, the Sanitation Department worker, testified
that it seemed like a "split second" from the time that the
truck started its turn until the time he saw it shaking,
something he associated with the collision (Tr. Vol. Ill, 415),
and that cars always travel in the middle of the road down the
subject stretch of Division Lane {id.,

417-18).

Ms. Holmstrom testified that she hadn't seen the truck
before she got out of the S-turn (Tr. Vol. Ill, 508); that when
she first saw the truck it was slowly moving out into the
eastbound lane of Division {id.,

508-09); that, when she first

saw the truck, she assumed that the truck would either stay on
its side of the road or stop and that she believed she had the
right of way {id.,

509-10); that she then realized that the

truck was proceeding farther northeasterly than she was
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comfortable with and that that surprised her {id.,

510); that

she decided, based on the fact that the truck was at that point
still proceeding forward, apparently into her lane of traffic,
she should go to the left (id.,

510-11); that she slammed on

the brakes and tried to go left, simultaneously, in an attempt
to get through where she figured there would be daylight

(id.,

511); that, although she could not recall whether the truck was
still moving when the impact occurred, it was moving when she
tried to go left (id.,

511-12); that at the point when she

realized she should try to go left, she was approximately
halfway between where she first saw the truck and where the
collision occurred (id.,

512); that, right after the collision

occurred, Mr. Hyatt came over and said "in almost a panic
manner/' "I didn't see you, I didn't see you" (emphasis added;
id.,

513-14); that, when she first saw the truck, she assumed

that its driver would "do what was right," and that he would
"either stay on his side of the road or stop" (id.,

539); that,

when she drives through residential areas, she tends to stay
kind of toward the middle because of things and people,
including children, that might be shooting out from her side
(id.,

559); that, when she knew that she had to take evasive

action, the truck looked like it was going to keep coming in
front of her even further (id.,

560); that if the truck had

stopped even close to being on its own side of the road she
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would have made a slight adjustment to the right and driven
right on past the truck (id.,

560-61).

Ronald Woolley, defendants' accident reconstruction
expert, testified that, having been to the scene and worked on
the case, he's observed that it's common for cars to
"straighten out" the S-curve as they drive through, and that
what Ms. Holmstrom did in so negotiating the curve and the
street at that point appears to be a "natural tendency" (Tr.
Vol. IV, 660); that Ms. Holmstrom was not driving at an
unreasonable speed [id.,

671-672); that the time it would take

Ms. Holmstrom to perceive and react to an emergency was
approximately one and one-half seconds (id.r

673); that

Ms. Holmstrom traveled, in that one and one-half seconds,
approximately 60 feet (id.);

that there was only 120 feet

between the time she first saw the truck and the point of
collision (id.,

674-75); that he does not fault someone for

simply checking a clock or a speedometer (id. , 679); that this
was a dynamic situation unfolding (id.,

686); that the reason

that Mr. Hyatt brought the truck to a halt was that he saw
Ms. Holmstrom's vehicle (id.,

691); that, given the dynamics of

the accident, "it's way too long" for Mr. Hyatt to have been
stopped for three or four seconds at the point of impact

(id.,

708); that it would take approximately a second and a half for
Mr. Hyatt, like Ms. Holmstrom, to perceive and react
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(id.,

714); that, after the perception and reaction time, it would
take Mr. Hyatt some additional time to bring his truck to a
stop (id.,

714); that it would take Mr. Hyatt, from the time he

began to perceive and react until the time he stopped his
truck, three to four seconds, "probably under five" (id.,

717-

18); that "the clock's the same for both [Ms. Holmstrom and
Mr. Hyatt]" (id.,

725); that "you crowd the center on this

road; I think the traffic does that" (emphasis added;

id.,

729); that it's "kind of natural when one is coming out of the
S-curve to "slice the corner, kind of straighten out the curve"
(id.,

731); that, as Ms. Holmstrom was driving along, she

didn't know of the wide turn Mr. Hyatt was going to make and
she didn't know he wasn't going to stop and be safe (id.

at

733); and that, if Ms. Holmstrom had reacted one-half second
sooner, she would have stopped without colliding with the truck
(id.

at 742).
3.

THE EVIDENCE, IF ANY, IN SUPPORT OF THE VERDICT, WAS
SO SLIGHT AND UNCONVINCING AS TO MAKE THE VERDICT
PLAINLY UNREASONABLE AND UNJUST.

In their Memorandum in Opposition to Ms. Holmstrom's posttrial Motion, defendants brought to the District Court's
attention cases, including Braithwaite v. West Valley City
Corp., 921 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1996) (R. at 925), supportive
of the proposition that the only time that a jury verdict
should be overturned, on Rule 59(a) (6) grounds is when that
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verdict is ''manifestly against the weight of the evidence."
This, Ms. Holmstrom respectfully submits, as is clear from the
foregoing recitation of the evidence, just such a case.

The

only conceivable basis, given the record of this case, for the
jury's "No" answer to the proximate cause question, and (as
explained hereinabove) the only basis on which defendants even
argued that the no-proximate-cause verdict could stand, was on
the supposed lack of a "substantial role" played by Mr. Hyatt's
negligence.

Again, there was no question that there was a

cause-and-effeet connection between Mr. Hyatt's making his
unsafe turn when he could not see whether anyone was coming; it
was a stipulated fact that Ms. Holmstrom sustained serious
injuries and damages as a result of the collision; and there
was no question that a reasonable person could foresee that
some injury could result from Mr. Hyatt's negligence.
The question then becomes whether the jury's finding that
Mr. Hyatt's negligence did not play a "substantial role" in
causing Ms. Holmstrom's damages was "manifestly against the
weight of the evidence," or, in the alternatively cast test of
Sharp v. Williams, 915 P.2d 495, 497 (Utah 1996), whether the
evidence in favor of the verdict was "so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and
unjust."

Stated somewhat more specifically, the question is

whether the jury could fairly conclude that either Mr. Hyatt's

negligence was so slight as to render it a non-substantial role
or that Ms. Holmstrom's negligence was so great as to fairly
render the role played by Mr. Hyatt's negligence nonsubstantial.

As has been demonstrated in the foregoing

marshalling of the evidence, it cannot fairly be stated that
Mr. Hyatt's negligence was inconsequential.

He selected a

route that was unsafe; he made too wide a turn; he ended up
well across the center of the road; he started his turn when he
knew he could not see who was coming along the street on which
drivers, including Ms. Holmstrom, had the right of away; and he
testified that he did not think Ms. Holmstrom's conduct was
unreasonable.

Nor can it be fairly concluded that

Ms. Holmstrom's negligence was comparatively so great as to
render Mr. Hyatt's negligence inconsequential.

As has been

demonstrated, her speed was reasonable, and her driving down
the middle of the road was something not at all out of the
ordinary.

All the defendants had to work with was the

proposition that Ms. Holmstrom should have anticipated, as a
defensive driver, that the England truck might come across the
road in front of her, and that all she did wrong was to
squander a half a second to a second.
In these circumstances, it cannot be fairly concluded that
Ms. Holmstrom's conduct, especially when compared against that
of Mr. Hyatt, was so great as to render not substantial the
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role his negligence caused in causing her injuries.

Careful

and thoughtful analysis thus leads inexorably to the conclusion
that the jury's no-proximate-cause conclusion was erroneous and
that Ms. Holmstrom is entitled to a new trial.
Ms. Holmstrom is confident that, once the Court considers
the evidence discussed in the foregoing recitation, and
whatever additional evidence Mr. Hyatt and C.R. England bring
to the Court's attention, the Court will be satisfied that, for
whatever reason, the jury rejected the overwhelming weight of
the evidence presented at trial and that application of settled
Utah standards of appellate review should cause the Court to
order a new trial.

For the evidence here was "so slight and

unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and
unjust."

Sharp v. Williams, 915 P.2d 495, 497 (Utah 1996);

Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982); Roylance v.
Rowe, 737 P.2d 232, 234 (Utah App. 1987).

Ms. Holmstrom

recognizes, and asks the Court to keep in mind that, if the
Court is not persuaded that the District Court should have
granted the j.n.o.v.,
[t]he standard to be applied by the trial court in
determining whether to grant a motion for a jnov is
stricter than the standard for deciding to grant a new
trial. A j.n.o.v. can be granted only when the losing
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988).

Unlike a party

appealing from the denial of a motion for a j.n.o.v., a party
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urging the court to recognize that there was insufficiency in
the evidence to warrant a particular factual finding must meet
the considerably less rigorous "so slight and unconvincing as
to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust" standard
recognized in Sharp, Nelson, Roylance cases cited above, and by
this Court in Ortiz v. Geneva Rock Products, Inc., 939 P. 2d
1213, 1216 (Utah App. 1997).
4.

CASES FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS SUPPORT
MS. HOLMSTROM'S POSITION. NO APPLICABLE UTAH CASE
HOLDS TO THE CONTRARY.

Courts from other jurisdictions have recognized, in
factual circumstances similar to those involved in this case,
that juries1 finding of "no proximate cause" have been
unsupported by the evidence and have acted to correct juries1
errors.
In Hardison v. Bushnell, 22 Cal. Rptr. 106 (Cal. App.
1993), for example, a California appellate court reversed the
trial courtfs denial of a plaintiff's motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial in a case in
which a jury had found negligence but no proximate cause in a
situation in which the defendant, a truck driver, had turned
into plaintiff's lane of travel.

In the course

of its cogent

analysis (the facts and the law are discussed in only three
pages), which Ms. Holmstrom commends to the Court's attention,
the Court observed:
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Clearly, respondent's turning his truck into the path
of [the vehicle in which the plaintiff was a
• passenger] was a substantial factor in causing the
injuries suffered by [the plaintiff].
Id.

at 107.
Also, in Rogers v. Pi Christina, 600 N.Y.S.2d 402 (N.Y.

App. 1993):
The jury found that defendants were negligent but that
their negligence did not proximately cause plaintiff!s
injuries.
Thereafter, the trial court granted plaintiffs1 motion to
set aside that portion of the jury verdict that found an
absence of causation because the jury!s finding was
against the weight of the evidence ... .
We conclude that [the trial court] properly set aside that
portion of the jury verdict that found that defendants'
negligence did not cause plaintiff's injuries. That finding could not have been reached upon any fair
interpretation of the evidence. [citations to New York
cases omitted].
Id.

at 403 (emphasis added).

Also instructive is Murteza v.

State of Connecticut, 508 A.2d 449 (Conn. App. 1986), a case
involving an intersection collision in which the jury found
negligence but no proximate cause and in which the appellate
court ultimately upheld the judgment on that verdict by reason
of the fact that, unlike in this case, the question of whether
the plaintiff had sustained any substantial injury was
vigorously contested in the evidence.

The Murteza court

observed, for purposes pertinent to the instant discussion:
... An examination of the photographs in evidence shows
substantial damage to the truck and the automobile ... .
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There is no doubt that under the ... conditions shown by the
evidence, [defendant's agent's] negligence ... must reasonably be found to have been a proximate cause of the
accident.
Id.

at 453.
In the circumstances of this case, there is no evidence,

let alone "sufficient evidence," to support the jury's finding
of no proximate cause.

As stated hereinabove, at 25,

Ms. Holmstrom's counsel has found no case from Utah or
elsewhere with facts and issues similar to those involved in
this case, in which a no-proximate-cause verdict has been
upheld on appeal.
In reiteration of what has been stated hereinabove, there
was "insufficient evidence to justify the verdict," and the noproximate-cause verdict was, in light of the evidence and the
pertinent instructions given and the reasonable inferences to
be drawn therefrom, clearly incorrect.

In these circumstances,

the District Court's denial of the Rule 59(a)(6) based aspect
of Ms. Holmstrom's post-trial motion was erroneous and
constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Ms. Holmstrom is,

accordingly, entitled to a new trial, and this Court should so
rule.
VI.

CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

The Utah Supreme Court cogently stated, nearly fifty years
ago:
As was observed by Lord Mansfield in Bright v. Eynon, 1
Burrows 390, the effect of a new trial is 'no more than
having the cause more deliberately considered by another
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jury, when there is reasonable doubt, or perhaps a
certainty, that justice has not been done.'
King v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 212 P.2d 692, 699 (Utah 1949).
Based on the foregoing analysis and on the record of this
case, Ms. Holmstrom urges the Court to reverse the District
Court and remand for new trial, either on all issues except the
question of the negligence of Mr. Hyatt and the proximate cause
connection between that negligence and Ms. Holmstrom's damages,
or for a new trial on all issues.
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ADDENDUM

SUBMITTED BY MS. HOLiMSTKOM
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

S-2

You may find, depending on the facts and
circumstances of this case, either or both drivers negligent
not only for their driving conduct itself but also, if he or
she or both knew the route taken was hazardous, for taking that
route.

Baker v. Decker, 212 P.2d 679 (Utah 1949)
Wiqhtman v. Bettilvon's, Inc., 390 P.2d 120 (Utah 1964)
Wald v. Qgden City, 258 P.2d 453 (Utah 1953)
Blacconeri v. Aauayof 478 N.E.2d 546, 550 (111. App. 1985)

SUBMITTED BY MS. HOLMSTROM
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

S-3

You may appropriately determine that Mr. Hyatt's
negligence was a proximate cause of Ms. Holmstrom's injuries,
if, but not only if, you find:

(1) that Mr. Hyatt negligently

caused a situation of sudden peril; and (2) that Ms. Holmstrom,
acting under the impulse of fear, made an instinctive effort to
escape; and (3) in so doing, Ms. Holmstrom sustained injuries,
even though it might now appear that Ms. Holmstrom's attempt to
escape was unwise or should have been made differently.

MUJI 4.3 (mod.)
BAJI No. 4.41 (1986). Reprinted with permission; copyright @
1986 West Publishing Company

nnl

—n-id

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

w

If you determine that either Mr. Hyatt or
Ms. Holmstrom was negligent, then you must also decide whether
that negligence was a "proximate cause" of any of
Ms. Holmstrom,s injuries.
To find "proximate cause," you must first find a
cause and effect relationship between any such negligence and
any of Ms. Holmstrom7s injuries.
not enough.

But cause and effect alone is

For an injury to be proximately caused by

negligence, two other factors must be present:
1.

The negligence must have played a substantial

role in causing the injury; and
2.

A reasonable person could foresee that some

injury could result from the negligence.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

®

There may be more than one proximate cause of the
same injury.

If the negligence of two or more persons combines

to produce an injury, and the negligence of each of them is a
proximate cause of the injury, then the persons must share
responsibility for the resulting injury, in proportion to their
individual negligence.

JURY INSTRUCTION NO. % >
In order for the burden of proof to be satisfied on
the proximate cause issue, it ds not necessary that you believe
that all of Ms. Holmstrom's claimed injuries and damages have
been caused by the negligence in question.

It is only required

that the proximate cause burden of proof be carried with
respect to any part of her claimed injuries.

